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Interpretation Step Zero:
A Limit on Methodology as "Law"
Legislated interpretive rules are everywhere. International law has them,'
every state has them,2 and Congress does too.' Even the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure open with an oft-overlooked legislated interpretive rule.' Most of
these rules are modest. The federal Dictionary Act, for instance, cautions that
singular words include their plural counterparts,' and that "he" can also mean
"she."6 Many state interpretive statutes are similarly timid, decreeing
bromides.
Some rules go further, however, and begin to tread on weightier aspects of
the interpretive enterprise. As of 2011, twenty-four states have enacted the
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (codifying customary
international law with respect to treaty interpretation).
2. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEo. L.J. 341,
350 & 11.35 (2010) (collecting such laws).
3. Dictionary Act, I U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (20o6) (codifying several rules for interpreting statutes).
4. These rules "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also FED. R.
EVID. 102 (setting forth a similar rule for the Federal Rules of Evidence).
5. 1 U.S.C. 5
6. Id.
7. See sources cited in Scott, supra note 2, at 411-27 (listing and grouping various legislative
interpretive rules in each of the states). As Scott identifies, most of these rules are intended
to guide permissible linguistic inferences that the expression of one thing suggests the
exclusion of others, that tenses are generally interchangeable, or that courts should follow
the ordinary usage of terms, unless the legislature gives them a specified or technical
meaning. Id. at 411-17.
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Model Penal Code's interpretive rules,' directing courts to infer that in the
absence of a specified mens rea, the mens rea is assumed to be recklessness.'
Others have repealed the common law rule of lenity, a rule that calls upon
courts to construe ambiguous penal statutes in favor of the accused.10
Congress, for its part, has attempted to create several national security "clear
statement" rules," while some states have sought to require that courts ignore
legislative history unless the text is ambiguous," or do the opposite and permit
recourse to legislative history even if the text is clear."
Yet, often, these legislated interpretive rules fail.' 4 This sets a puzzle for
scholars and judges alike, one that has led to considerable recent debate over
the legal status of such rules." But scholars seem to agree on one particular
point: Judicial failures to implement binding interpretive rules are a product of
8. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DuKE L.J.
285, 289 & n.8 (2012).
g. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3); id. 5 2.02(4) (1981).
io. Jeffrey A. Love, Comment, Fair Notice About Fair Notice, 121 YALE L.J. 2395, 2395-97 & nn.4-7
(2012).
ii. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National-Security Law, 43 GA. L.
REV. 1059, io6o (2009).
12. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1791-97 (2010) (describing
the Connecticut experience).
13. See id. at 1785-91 (describing Texas's Code Construction Act).
14. See Brown, supra note 8, at 292 (describing state courts' "pervasive failure" to employ the
Model Penal Code's interpretive provisions); Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 433-34 (2004) (describing
the failure of U.S. courts to abide by the rules in the internationally binding Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties); Gluck, supra note 12, at 1775-1811 (describing the
breakdown of legislatively and judicially crafted binding interpretive methodologies across
multiple states); Mitchell, supra note 11, at 1o61-66 (describing the failure of clear statement
rules in national security law); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57, 123-34 (1998) (describing the failure of lenity-repealing statutes to
eliminate the rule of lenity); Love, supra note to, at 2397 & n.1s (same).
15. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONsT. COMMENT. 97 (2003); Sydney Foster, Should
Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863,
1884-97 (20o8); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909-18 (2011); Gluck, supra note 12, at 1847;
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085,
2156 (2002); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of
Stare Decisis as Applied to judicial Methodology, 1o8 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 709 (2008). This
scholarship makes up a small slice of the vast and sophisticated literature that deals with the
constitutionality of legislated interpretive rules, but these relevant pieces give enough




"reluctance," "resistance,"" and "evasion.",, These failures are part of a
calculated strategy of judicial opposition, the product of a conscious decision to
ignore the interpretive rules.
These accounts no doubt contain some truth. But this Comment argues
that they mask a deeper, though more difficult to express, anxiety. Judges
cannot apply a legally binding interpretive framework without first overcoming
an unavoidable and often insurmountable interpretive obstacle -step zero, the
initial inquiry into whether the interpretive framework applies at all. Making
this step zero determination often forces judges into the middle of an
intertemporal clash between a past and present legislature -a difficult lose-lose
situation. This step zero problem ultimately means that binding interpretive
methodologies are almost sure to unravel unless there is methodological
consensus among past and future legislatures.
Parts I and II explain the structural tension implicit in mandating an
interpretive methodology without first achieving interpretive consensus. Part
III shows how this tension operates in practice, while disputing the resistance
hypothesis. While scholars ordinarily attribute failures to follow rules
mandating binding interpretive methodologies to judicial willfulness, this
criticism is unwarranted. Judges who fail to heed interpretive rules are often
among the legislature's most faithful agents. Judges may fail to implement
binding methodological frameworks not because they won't, but because they
can't.
I. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INFINITE REGRESS
Prior to the application of any legal rule, a court must first determine
whether the rule applies. This is step zero.' 9 Treating interpretive methodology
16. Love, supra note io, at 2396.
17. Brown, supra note 8, at 303; Gluck, supra note 12, at 1757 (terming judicial failures to
implement legislated interpretive rules "resist[ance]" and the product of "interbranch power
struggles").
18. Mitchell, supra note n1, at 1091-92. Though Mitchell uses "evasion" specifically to describe
the actions of lawyers in the executive branch, he remarks that federal courts have failed to
"counter[] the executive branch's evasion," id., and notes that "judicial enforcement of
codified clear-statement requirements is sporadic and unpredictable" and "[t] he outcomes
in court bear no relationship to a legislature's decision to establish narrow, rule-like, or
explicit clear-statement requirements in national-security framework legislation," id. at
1098.
19. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (20o6) (identifying Chevron
step zero as the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all); Anthony
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as law is no different.2 o To treat an interpretive methodology as law requires
that, before applying the methodology, the judge first decide whether the
methodology governs the interpretation of the particular statute in the
particular case in which it is invoked. The judge cannot rely on the statute itself
to determine whether to apply the statute because whether the statutory
interpretation methodology in the statute should be applied is precisely what
needs to be determined. The judge must instead, therefore, appeal to some other
source of interpretive authority before applying the methodological
framework."
For example, if precedent requires the application of a particular statutory
interpretation methodology, deciding whether the methodology should be
used to interpret a particular statute depends on that judge's theory of
precedent." More importantly, at least for those who advocate legislated
interpretive rules, if a methodological statute, M, tells a judge to apply a
particular statutory interpretation methodology to some subset of statutes, a
judge interpreting some substantive statute, S, must first determine if the
statutory interpretation methodology required by M applies to the specific
statute, S. This requires the judge to interpret M using an interpretive
methodology whose authority is not derived from the directives of M.
Not only must the judge interpret M without reference to M to decide if it
applies to S, but in the process the judge must also interpret S to determine if S
falls within the class of statutes subject to M. While this could be a simple
matter (such as deciding whether S is a statute at all) it could be as difficult as
determining whether S is a penal statute, or whether the legislature, in enacting
statute S, intended that S not be subject to M's interpretive methodology.
Thus, in applying M to S, the judge must first apply at least some
independent interpretive criteria outside the scope of M to determine whether
M applies to S. But, as the next Part explains, certain axioms accepted by all
interpreters - textualists and purposivists alike-counsel that in many
situations, statutes dictating methodological rules cannot be applied to later
substantive statutes without violating important legal norms.
Vitarelli, Comment, Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 837 (2010) (describing
the same as applied to the constitutional avoidance canon).
2o. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that one cannot apply a
statute without first construing it).
21. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 65, 76-77 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
22. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH LEGISLATING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGY
To interpret statute S according to statute M demands that a judge first
determine whether M applies to S. This application requires two (and
potentially three) inquiries: First, did the legislature that enacted M intend for
M to govern the interpretation of S?" Second, did the legislature that enacted S
intend for S to be covered by MP And, perhaps, third, are there any other
reasons (of natural law, separation of powers, or special circumstances) why M
should not apply to S?2
These questions reveal that M's scope will often be cabined-with respect
to statutes enacted both before and after M-to conform with widely held
23. One can quibble about whether the questions should make no mention of legislative
"intention," but the inquiries are identical even if references to "legislative intention" are
removed and the statutes are considered only in terms of what they "mean" objectively.
Since such a construction is odd, I have phrased the questions in this manner instead.
24. Some have argued that this inquiry is unnecessary-that the failure to explicitly repeal M
means judges should simply apply M to S without reference to what S might otherwise say
about the scope of M in this particular case. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note ii, at 1071-72; Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, iii YALE L.J. 1665,
1666-68 (2002); Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 2117-18. But this argument rests on two
subtle conflations. First, in deciding whether S is within the class of statutes covered by M,
one can either choose to take account of what S says about M's applicability without recourse
to M, or, alternatively, apply M and then attempt to see what S says about M's applicability.
Whether the interpreter chooses to apply M first or not, however, is a step zero issue that
has to do with the interpreter's own views about the proper method of interpretation. Thus,
those who say "just apply M to S" are really making a normative point about what should be
done at step zero, even though these arguments often make it seem as if there is simply no
step zero problem at all. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. But there is even another
conflation at work here. Often, even if an interpreter interprets according to M and then
asks whether S is meant to be covered by M, it does not resolve the difficult step zero
question of whether S's authors meant for S to be covered by M. It only changes how that
inquiry is performed. If application of M leads to an absurd result, or even if S strongly
hints that it was not meant to be covered by M, the interpreter will probably conclude that S
was not meant to be covered by M even if the interpretation of S is being performed through
the lens of M. This famously occurred in State v. Gaines, 2o6 P. 3d 1042, 1046-49 (Or. 2009),
in which the Oregon Supreme Court applied its interpretive framework M to S, saw that it
led to an absurdity, and then disengaged the framework and ran through the inquiry again to
see if S was really meant to be interpreted according to M. As a final note, it might be
pointed out that the amount of space the interpreter is willing to give to the legislature that
enacted S to repeal M by implication is not objectively determined but rather also depends
on the interpreter's own views about how to engage in statutory interpretation.
25. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889); see also RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 15-20 (1986) (discussing a similar case).
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interpretive norms. There are two reasons for this. First, it is a nearly universal
rule of interpretation that the specific governs the general. There are strong
policy considerations undergirding this rule, most importantly the problem of
unintended consequences. If a legislature enacts a general rule, often it has
not foreseen, and cannot foresee, all of that rule's potential implications.
Second, it is a foundational rule of statutory interpretation that no
legislature may bind the hands of its successors." Therefore, if a subsequent
legislature passes S and does not wish for S to be interpreted according to M's
methodology, the interpreter is at least as bound to honor that choice as he is
to honor M.2 ,
Thus, imagine that after M is enacted, a legislature passes S. Two obstacles
confront the judge applying M to S. First, it might be difficult to determine if
the broad class of statues to which M was meant to apply includes S. For
instance, if M requires that federal statutes conferring a federal "right" should
be interpreted in a particular manner, the interpreter may be required to ask
whether S confers a right at all, a potentially difficult inquiry.30 But even if S is
26. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 183-88 (2012); id. at 185 (describing how specific provisions in both later and earlier
statutes should be upheld over general provisions).
27. E.g., Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 718 n.17 (1946); Rodgers v. United States, 185
U.S. 83, 88 (1902); Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 570-71 (1883); see SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 26, at 183 ("[T]hink of it this way: the specific provision comes closer to
addressing the very problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of
credence."),
z8. Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); see also, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90
("Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.");
SCAuA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 278 ("Resting as it does on sheer logic, the principle
dates from time immemorial.").
29. This argument is not the old argument against legislated interpretive rules that says they
cannot be binding because they unconstitutionally bind the hands of a later legislature. That
argument, as many scholars have correctly pointed out, proves too much. After all, all
statutes fundamentally alter the normative universe into which future statutes are passed.
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note ii, at 1071-72; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1666;
Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 2118. Rather, the point here is merely to acknowledge what
everyone already knows: if a later Congress wants to change the law, it can.
30. This analogy is drawn from a line of cases that begins with Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980). In Thiboutot, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for
deprivations under color of state law of federal statutory rights. Id. at ii (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Admittedly, these statutes are not strictly interpretive in their directives, but for
purposes of this analogy, one might think of § 1983 as M and a statute that creates a federal
statutory right as S. The quest to determine what counts as a right might be seen as an
embodiment of the difficulty of construing the scope of M. See JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD
2o6o
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interpreted as within the class covered by M, the inquiry does not end, for the
legislature that passed S may not have even considered M, and the application
of M to S may fundamentally interfere with S's substantive aims. At this point,
a court probably will not apply M to S, because the general aims of M will
interfere with the specific aims of S."3
III. THE ISSUE IN PRACTICE: TWO CASE STUDIES
These problems with legislated statutory interpretation methodology are
the principal reason that such rules so often fail. This is not mere postulate.
Often, courts' stated reasons for failing to interpret statutes according to
legislated interpretive rules track the step zero inquiry.
Scholars who refer to such interpretive difficulties as "reluctance," 2
"resistance,"" and "evasion"' underestimate the bind into which mandatory
methodologies place judges. These scholars fail to account for the ways in
which judges must give effect to the prerogatives of past and future legislatures
prior to invoking the interpretive framework at all.
This Part offers two case studies. First, it describes a major Supreme Court
national security case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.s Second, it describes the experience
of many states in enacting interpretive rules for penal statutes. In each of these
case studies, the arguments align: judges, obliged to give effect to the specific
intent of one legislature over the general intention of a prior legislature or
judicial precedent, "ignored" otherwise legally binding interpretive rules.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: A Hard Step Zero Case
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was a case decided by the Supreme Court in 2004 that
A. MERRIuLL & PETER SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
1286-91 (6th ed. 2009).
31. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that a statute called the "Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,"
42 U.S.C. § 6011 (1976), was not within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 27-29. It would
be hard for any court to argue that a "Bill of Rights Act" did not confer a right. See id. at
33-35 (White, J., dissenting). The Court's rationale, however, was that Congress in passing
this statute had not intended for it to fall within the scope of M. Id. at 18, 31-32. Congress's
specific aim was to "create[] funding incentives to induce the States" to provide better care
and treatment to the developmentally disabled, "[b]ut ... do no more than that." Id. at 31.
32. Love, supra note lo, at 2395.
33. Brown, supra note 8, at 303; Gluck, supra note 12, at 1750.
34. Mitchell, supra note ii, at 1078.
35. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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posed a difficult step zero problem. Though it involved a complex question of
the scope and effect of a prior clear statement statute, hostility to legislated
interpretive rules was nowhere to be found.
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorizing the President to
use all "necessary and appropriate force"6 against nations, groups, and persons
involved in the September i, 2001, attacks complied with a prior statute, the
Non-Detention Act (NDA). The NDA bars the imprisonment or detention of a
citizen of the United States "except pursuant to an Act of Congress." By
requiring that detention be authorized by "an Act of Congress," the NDA
seems to require that Congress clearly state that it intends to authorize citizen
detention in accord with the NDA-similar to a congressional "clear statement"
rule of the kind Congress has enacted in other contexts."
The AUMF, which only has about one-hundred sixty operative words,
devotes sixty of them to declaring the AUMF to be "specific statutory
authorization" for the President to engage in hostilities under the War Powers
Resolution (another statute with a clear statement requirement). The AUMF,
however, mentions neither detention nor the NDA explicitly." Even though
the NDA and the AUMF speak in plain terms -one barring detention without
an "Act of Congress," one authorizing the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force" -the statutes are difficult to reconcile.4 o
The question in Hamdi could not be resolved by simply asking what the
NDA had to say about how to interpret the AUMF. Rather, the case called on
each Justice to apply her own ideas about the proper method of statutory
interpretation. 4' That is, the debate occurred at step zero. Two Justices (Justices
Souter and Ginsburg) held that the AUMF did not comply with the NDA,
36. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (20o6).
38. See Mitchell, supra note i1.
39. See 50 U.S.C. § 15 4 1(2)(b) (2006).
40. One might legitimately question whether the Non-Detention Act (NDA) is properly
regarded as a methodological statute. But it is a binding prohibition on interpreting some
subset of statutes a certain way. If a statute is vague but might be interpreted as licensing
citizen detention, the NDA instructs courts to disfavor this interpretation. In other words, it
requires that Congress speak clearly if it wishes to authorize detention.
41. For instance, Justices Ginsburg and Souter consulted legislative history, while Justice
O'Connor and the plurality largely ignored it. Neither side commented on the implications
to be drawn from the fact that the AUMF devoted over a third of its operative provisions to
complying with the War Powers Resolution - though one could argue its implications under
the NDA either way.
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three Justices signed opinions that did not comment (Justices Stevens, Scalia,
and Thomas), and the plurality held that it complied (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer), but also seemed to imply that
even if it had not, the AUMF was not governed by the NDA.4 1
Justices Souter and Ginsburg engaged in a classic step zero analysis. First,
they argued that the NDA's enactors meant for its prohibitions to be read
broadly, because it was enacted in light of Korematsu v. United States43 and the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II,4 was enacted at a
time when Congress was enacting many clear statement rules,45 and was meant
to safeguard liberty."6 They then argued that the AUMF was not intended to
comply with or repeal the NDA, because it was framed in general terms and
related to the use of military force, and did not specifically reference detention,
as they thought the NDA required.47
The plurality strongly disagreed. Finding it unnecessary to definitively
construe the scope of the NDA, 5 they thought the terms "necessary and
appropriate force" in the context of an authorization for military force were
sufficiently clear to authorize detention even if the NDA had required greater
clarity." The plurality held that "it is of no moment that the AUMF does not
use specific language of detention ... [b]ecause detention ... is a fundamental
incident of waging war."so
In other words, even if the NDA explicitly required that Congress enact
specific statutory language to comply with its terms, the question would still
have been a close one. One could argue-and the plurality in Hamdi did
argue-that it would make little sense to authorize "all necessary and
appropriate force" without intending to grant the President the power to
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (describing the distribution of joins,
concurrences, and dissents in the case).
43. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
44. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
45. Id. at 544.
46. Id. at 544-45.
47. Id. at 54S-46.
48. Id. at 517 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 518.
So. Id. at 519.
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detain-even if the NDA required such clarity.s"
Hamdi reveals the difficulty that arises when a present Congress
confronting a perceived need enacts a law written in general terms, possibly
overlooking several statutes imposed by past legislatures designed specifically
to require it to act more methodically and carefully. The resulting interpretive
mire is not reluctance or resistance, but struggle: struggle to weigh competing
values that the imposition of the prescribed interpretive rule cannot, of its own
force, overcome.
B. Rules for Interpreting Penal Statutes"
Eleven states have repealed the judicial common law rule of lenity, and at
least five others have statutes that seem to abrogate the rule at least in part.s" In
addition, twenty-four states have implemented the Model Penal Code's
interpretive rules." Yet, in all of these states, courts have regularly failed to
apply the legislated interpretive rules.ss Moreover, many of them have couched
their difficulties not in terms of resistance, but instead in terms of fidelity to
legislative intention and rule-of-law values intrinsic to step zero.
When courts narrow lenity-repealing statutes, they expose the same
structural tensions that animate step zero analysis in other contexts, imputing
to the legislature that enacted the lenity-repealing statute an intent to comply
with the settled rule-of-law norms that animate the rule of lenity itself, arguing
that the legislature that repealed the rule of lenity could not have intended the
repeal to apply to the facts of this particular case. In doing so, courts have in
essence been applying the rule of lenity in their readings of the lenity-repealing
statutes.s" Some courts have said this explicitly. In State v. Pena, for example,
the Arizona Court of Appeals wrote: "[W]here the [repealing] statute itself is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any
si. See id. at 518-19. That is, even if M (the NDA) had applied to S (the AUMF), the plurality
seemed prepared to hold that the AUMF's authors did not mean for the NDA to apply to the
AUMF and therefore that the NDA did not restrict the AUMF.
52. This case study is adapted from Brown, supra note 8, and Love, supra note lo, at 2397-98.
53. Love, supra note io, at 2395.
54. Brown, supra note 8, at 289-90.
5s. Id. at 297; Love, supra note lo, at 2399-2403.
s6. Love, supra note io, at 2398-99 (explaining the reasoning in Keeler v. Superior Court, 470





doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant."1 As Professor Lawrence
Solan has elsewhere observed, even though New York has had a
lenity-repealing statute for more than a hundred years, "New York courts
continue to impose lenity when they have nothing better to say about how a
statute should be interpreted."s" And both Solan and Jeffrey Love note that
Keeler v. Superior Court," a frequently cited California case, was decided on
lenity grounds despite the state's 1871 statute repealing the rule of lenity."o The
court in Keeler famously interpreted the lenity-repealing statute-which was
broadly worded, commanding courts to interpret statutes "according to the fair
import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote
justice",6 , -as consistent with the use of the rule of lenity.6 ,
States that have adopted the Model Penal Code's (MPC) interpretive
provisions have seen their courts repeatedly argue that subsequent legislatures
enacting penal statutes did not intend for their statutes to be read according to
the interpretive conventions set out in the MPC. As a result, these courts have
not used the MPC's conventions to interpret more recent statutes even though
the MPC's interpretive provisions are on the books.6 ' For example, the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that it would not apply the default MPC rules in
State v. Rutley because, even though it had "stated that statutory silence alone is
not a sufficiently clear indication of legislative intent to dispense with a
culpable mental state," the crime's seriousness left no doubt that the legislature
intended strict liability.6" The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the
absence of a term was sufficient to imply that the legislature intended
strict liability even though the state had adopted the MPC interpretive rules.
The court reasoned that, although the rules seemed to require the court to
presume the underlying element of the crime required one to act with
knowledge, "[o]rdinarily, the mental state required by a statute is expressly
designated"s6 -a convention strong enough to override the state's statutory
57. State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), affd, 683 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1984).
58. Solan, supra note 14, at 125.
59. Keeler, 470 P.2d 617.
6o. See Solan, supra note 14, at 126-27; Love, supra note lo, at 2398-99.
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 2012).
62. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 625-26.
63. Brown, supra note 8, at 298-307 (explaining the approaches in a variety of state court judicial
opinions that follow this model).
64. State v. Rutley, 171 P. 3d 361, 364-65 (Or. 2007).
65. State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682, 685 (Conn. 1995). This is not necessarily an unusual
interpretive move. The United States Supreme Court has made similar moves, once holding
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commitment to the MPC. The Ohio Court of Appeals simply held that
important criminal law values would not be served by applying the MPC
interpretive provisions to a particular criminal statute, and thus interpreted the
statute as not intended to come within those provisions."6
Professor Darryl Brown sees these cases as clear evidence of "interpretive
strategies that avoid or undermine their state codes' MPC culpability
presumptions.",6  But the courts in deciding these cases do not cast their
decisions in such terms. They seem to say the opposite: that while aware of the
MPC statutes on the books, the legislature that enacted a particular criminal
statute did not draft it in compliance with the MPC interpretive rules.
Professor Brown himself argues that these interpretive moves are the result of a
shift in society's criminal law norms.6 ' But if norms have shifted, and these
courts are merely attempting to give effect to statutes as the legislatures that
enacted them intended, it is difficult to see these courts' interpretive moves as
avoidance and resistance rather than faithful agency in the truest sense.
CONCLUSION
The interpretive problem outlined in this Comment will not arise with
most statutes in most cases. This is because most statutes will yield the same
conclusions under any interpretive canon. But in hard cases, precisely where a
binding interpretive rule is most likely to alter the outcome, interpreters are
also most strongly pulled to give weight to the specific aims of a later
legislature rather than the more general structural aspirations of a legislature or
court in the more distant past. Without evidence that the legislature intended
its statute to be interpreted according to a particular interpretive framework,
strong interpretive norms drive judges to give effect to specific substantive
aims at the expense of interpretive purity.
The purpose of this Comment is not to argue that methodology can never
be law-like. I instead seek to show that the adoption of a methodological
that cigarettes were not "drug delivery devices" in the face of unmistakable statutory text.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) ("It is a
'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."' (quoting Davis
v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
66. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting a defendant's argument
that the court should read a mental state into a criminal statute).
67. Brown, supra note 8, at 303.
68. See, e.g., Denby, 668 A.2d at 685; State v. Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428, 428-31 (Ohio 1981); Rutley,
171 P.3 d at 365.




framework depends more on the cooperation of subsequent legislatures than
the fidelity of future interpreters.7 o It is possible to create a stable
methodological consensus between courts and legislatures such that
application of statute M to all or nearly all statutes S is an accepted norm that
carries nearly the weight of law. In that situation, legislatures implicitly adopt,
acknowledge, and draft within the legislated or judicially created interpretive
framework- perhaps achieving the best of all possible outcomes. Indeed, this
has happened before. The evolution of judicial review of agency action through
the Chevron deference doctrine is an excellent example of the successful
evolution of a shared interpretive norm."
The focus of debates over the nature of methodological statutes might
therefore benefit from a shift away from arguments over whether
methodological statutes are or can be "law" to a discussion more focused on
how to make these statutes stick. Methodological statutes seem to benefit from
specificity, though specificity by its very nature limits the number of statutes to
which methodological guidance might apply. The background norms a
methodological statute intends either to cement or to upend also seem to factor
importantly into its success. Some methodological statutes, such as those
codifying administrative law norms, appear sticky, while others, such as those
attempting to modify criminal law norms, seem to slip. A study of the factors
contributing to stickiness could prove fruitful, perhaps moving the
conversation beyond the conventional account of judicial resistance and closer
to one sensitive to the difficulty and complexity that inheres in interpretation
step zero.
ANDREW TUTT
70. Contra Gluck, supra note 12, at 1822-24 (arguing that results from state courts seem to show
that courts can impose a binding interpretive framework on the legislature and "stick with
it" even in the absence of consensus).
i. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical
Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation and the Canons, 65 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013)
(explaining that United States congressional drafters know about and draft according to
Chevron).
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